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rapidly increasing. Facilitating and promoting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been a central 
item in such trade agreements. Although, the prospect for attracting additional foreign investment 
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expansion in foreign investments. This thesis assesses the potential foreign investment effects of the 
EU – Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade agreement by analyzing relevant literature 
regarding the link between PTAs and FDI flows. The results indicate a potential increase in FDI 
flows in certain sectors, mostly resulting from FDI liberalization. A higher impact in Canada is more 
likely to result due to significantly higher restrictions on the FDI regulations than in the EU. Internal 
FDI distribution might change, especially in the EU, when exporting comes less costly within the 
integrated bloc and multinational corporations change production from one country to another. The 
overall effect is expected to be positive, however its significance is uncertain.  
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 3 
1. Introduction  
 
In recent years facilitating and promoting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been a central item in 
large trade agreements. Prospect for attracting foreign investment is generally recognized as one of 
the main reasons for entering Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) (Medvedev, 2011). PTAs create 
a more integrated trade bloc, which in the short run, is expected to stimulate intra-regional trade and 
investment within the integrated bloc, and in the longer run, growth rates are expected to increase due 
to larger markets, tougher competition, more efficient resource allocation and various positive 
externalities (Blomström & Kokko, 1997). 
 
Preferential Trade Agreements as a whole include number of provisions and guarantees which are 
important for attracting foreign investment. The provisions are not guaranteeing additional 
investment; however, are potential determinants for attracting FDI. Investment provisions target 
particularly facilitating foreign investments. In addition, FDI is often encouraged by ‘national 
treatment’ ensuring equal treatment for foreign and domestic investors. PTAs which grant higher 
protection for firm-specific assets - such as human capital and intellectual property - are more likely 
to gain investor confidence and attract foreign investment flows (WTO, 2011). Another critical 
requirement is allowing freer movement of corporate personnel, and including a dispute settlement 
mechanism and proper investor protection will further improve the investor confidence 
 
After eight years of negotiations the European Union and Canada are signing the most ambitious 
agreement ever signed by the counterparts thus far. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) is a trade agreement between the EU and Canada. By boosting trade, CETA is 
anticipated to create growth, jobs, and new market opportunities especially for small and medium 
sized companies. Removing nearly all custom duties CETA will lower prices and widen the choice 
for customers. Through various commitments made by the Parties CETA will create more 
opportunities for companies and make firms more competitive in EU and Canada. One of the main 
goals in CETA is to alleviate barriers to foreign investments and promote investments among Canada 
and EU. 
 
This forward-looking analysis seeks to estimate CETA's potential impacts on FDI between the 
counterparts, as well as analyze the existing and possible obstacles complicating the FDI flow. The 
relationship between FDI and trade agreements is not straightforward and generally not well 
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understood (Blomström & Kokko, 1997; Chen, 2009; Medvedev, 2011). Generally, most studies 
suggest a positive relationship yet not a significant one. The channel how PTAs affect FDI incentives 
varies among the studies. Along with reducing FDI barriers, trade agreements have potential to affect 
foreign investments through diverse channels. Commitments made in areas such as trade, labor 
mobility, intellectual property rights, and investor protection mechanism have potential to attract 
foreign investment flows. However, some of these determinants can have two-way influences on FDI, 
and instead of increasing, FDI inflow might decrease.  
 
A positive impact from CETA as a whole on FDI is expected, and it could be ‘notable’ but it is not 
likely to be significant. The magnitude will be different in Canada and the EU mostly due to 
differences in the level of FDI restrictions. Currently exceptionally high level of restrictions is making 
Canada a less competitive location for FDI. CETA has a significant potential to attract FDI in Canada 
by reducing and abolishing the restrictions. FDI inflow is likely to increase in certain sectors mostly 
due to liberalization of the ownership limitations. The internal FDI distribution can be expected to 
change, especially in the EU where member states are relatively heterogeneous. 
 
Without any existing empirical research of the topic this analysis will rely on the relevant literature 
on Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA), such as North America Free Trade Agreement. To achieve 
a better understanding of the impact without empirical evidence it is necessary to examine 
determinants attracting FDI, similar free trade agreements, current relationship between the EU and 
Canada, and the content of CETA as well.  
 
Due to page limitations, the following topics must be noted for narrowing the analysis. Firstly, both 
the European Union and Canada will be considered as a whole, not specifying any country or 
provincial differences or effects. Secondly, not only the EU and Canada will benefit from this 
agreement, but also third countries may encounter positive impacts. However, any positive or 
negative effect to third countries will be ignored, as well as their role as investors in the EU and 
Canada. The focus is only on the investment flows between the agreement parties. Lastly, United 
Kingdom is an important trade and investment partner for Canada. If and when UK’s prospective 
withdrawal from the European Union, Brexit, takes place it can have a retardant impact on the 
commissioning of CETA as well as the consequences of the agreement. Analyzing the impact of 
Brexit will be left outside of this thesis.  
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This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part will discuss i) Foreign Direct Investment and the 
motives for entering foreign investment, ii) Preferential Trade Agreements and the impact on FDI iii) 
previous PTAs and their impact on FDI. The second part focus is on CETA and it consists of i) 
overview of the bilateral economic relations of the EU and Canada, ii) current restrictions relating to 
FDI, iii) familiarization on CETA, and the potential impacts on FDI in Canada and the EU, and iv) 
the positive impacts on CETA based on the analysis of NAFTA and AUSFTA. 
 
2. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is defined as a category of cross-border investments which involves 
long-term commitment in which an investor establishes a lasting interest in a foreign country and has 
a significant level of influence over a business (OECD, 2008). Ownership of 10% or more of the 
voting power is considered as direct investment and ownership of less than 10% is a portfolio 
investment. Generally, FDI is distributed into two categories; greenfield investments, and mergers 
and acquisitions (OECD, 2008). In greenfield investment, an entirely new company is established in 
the target country, whereas mergers and acquisitions mean complete or partial purchasing of an 
existing firm.  
 
Many authors have attempted to address theory for explaining foreign investments however, no 
agreed general theory exists. Dunning (1993) created an eclectic paradigm (known also as OLI 
paradigm) which seeks to create a general framework for examining contextual specific theories of 
foreign direct investment and international production (as cited in UNCTAD, 1998). Eclectic 
paradigm, as the name implies, is a combination of alternative existing theories of FDI. The paradigm 
and motives for choosing particular FDI location are presented below.  
 
 
2.1. FDI determinants 
 
Eclectic paradigm, by Dunning (1993), presents three commonly agreed sets of determinants which 
have to exist simultaneously for FDI to take place: ownership-specific advantages, locational 
advantages, and the presence of superior commercial benefits in an intra-firm as against an arm’s-
length relationship between investor and recipient (as cited in UNCTAD, 1998). The first stands for 
company’s owned advantages e.g. proprietary technology or brand name recognition, which in the 
best-case scenario can compensate the costs rising in establishing new affiliates and production in a 
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foreign country.  The second means the attractiveness of the host country determined by its 
advantages, such as low labor costs, functioning infrastructure, or large markets. Lastly, the third 
condition claims that the first and second determinants profit greater benefits through internalization. 
(UNCTAD, 1998) 
 
According to Dunning & Lundan (2008) if only the first condition is met, companies rely on exports, 
licensing, or the sale of the patents over FDI. FDI comes more attractive if the second and third 
condition are added. In other words, none of these conditions develop FDI by themselves but when 
all conditions are in effect FDI becomes attractive. Whether and where companies decide to engage 
in FDI endeavors depends on sufficient country specific advantages which match the motives of the 
particular FDI (Feils & Rahman, 2008). 
 
Motives for choosing the particular investment location can be categorized into market-seeking, 
efficiency seeking, and resource-seeking behavior (see Table 1) (Feils & Rahman, 2008). The goal 
for these strategies is, for example, to spread or reduce risks, pursue oligopolistic competition and 
match competitors’ actions, or look for distinct sources of competitive advantage (OECD, 1998). 
Table 1 demonstrates the broad scale of potential determinants attracting FDI flow and presents the 
connection between FDI determinants. 
 
Market size and market growth often attract market-seeking companies. Growing markets provide 
the ability to grow within the industry and achieve scale and scope economies (Kudina & Jakubiak, 
2008). In addition, market-seeking FDI tends to appear in countries which have high trade barriers 
and cannot be accessed through other than FDI (Feils & Rahman, 2008). Whereas, resource-seeking 
companies will locate in countries where resources sought are abundant (e.g. natural resources or low 
labor costs). These resources are generally not available at home or are available at a lower price in 
foreign country. 
 
Efficiency-seeking FDI comes into a country which has locational advantages which enable a 
company to compete in international markets and fully realize the internationalization benefits of the 
firm’s assets (Feils & Rahman, 2008). There are two types of efficiency-seeking FDI. In the first, 
firms “take advantage of differences in the availability and relative cost of traditional factor 
endowments in different countries” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Whereas in the second case firms 
“take advantage of economies of scale and scope and of differences in consumer tastes and supply 
capabilities” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
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Table 1. Host country determinants of FDI 
 
Note: Host country determinants of FDI. Adapted from “World Investment Report 1998, Trends and determinants” 
by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1998. p. 91 
 
 
 
3. Preferential Trade Agreement 
 
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), such as NAFTA, AUSFTA, and MERCOSUR are broad 
agreements with provisions on both trade in goods and services, and investments. Such agreements 
are established between two or more countries and allow preferential treatment for the counterparts. 
PTAs remove intraregional trade barriers among the members and contain FDI liberalization 
provisions to facilitate foreign investments. Consequences of liberalization will be that the host state 
amends or abolishes the laws prohibiting foreign investors from investing in its domestic market. In 
addition, PTAs contain relatively comprehensive set of foreign investment rules on what terms and 
to which sectors are investments welcomed.  
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This chapter is divided into two parts, the first will analyze Preferential Trade Agreements and the 
focus will be on whether establishing favorable low risk legal environment and guaranteeing equal 
and safe treatment for foreign investors will attract more FDI inflow. The second part analyzes FDI 
impacts occurred from previous PTAs. Two PTAs were chosen to be addressed: North America Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Australia – United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA).  
 
 
3.1. Preferential Trade Agreements impact on FDI 
 
In previous literature, the relationship between PTAs and FDI is generally not well understood. Most 
findings suggest a positive correlation however, the channel how PTAs affect FDI incentives differs 
(Medvedev, 2011). Medvedev (2011) conducted a research and results indicated that PTAs are 
associated with increases in FDI, however mostly driven by developing countries. As well as Büthe 
& Milner (2008) found positive causality between trade agreements and FDI, when analyzing the 
relationship of international political institutions, such as WTO and PTAs, and FDI inflow. The 
results showed that FDI flow was higher when the number of signed PTAs increased and interestingly 
Lederman et al. (2005) found correlation between FDI flow and the expectation of joining a PTA (as 
cited in Medvedev, 2011). 
 
According to UNCTAD (2009) the removal of intraregional trade barriers is a simple explanation 
why PTA may stimulate FDI. Removing the barriers affects one of the main determinant of FDI – 
market size – as it creates larger regional market (UNCTAD, 2009). In contrast, Adams et al. (2003) 
found non-trade provisions to be the most important driver of FDI flow. Table 2 presents the results 
of Adams et al. (2003) research who studied the main drivers of investments in PTAs. Non-trade 
provisions, particularly those related to investments and services, were the most common attractor of 
FDI. With a weak evidence ‘beachhead effects of trade provisions’ seemed to be the second important 
driver and third was ‘tariff jumping effects of trade provisions’. ‘Beachhead’ effect happens when 
investment is executed in order to serve the markets of the others. 
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Table 2. Main drivers of investments in PTAs 
 
Note: Main drivers of investments in PTAs. Adapted from “The Trade and Investment Effects of Preferential 
Trading Arrangements – Old and New Evidence” by Adams et al. 2003. Productivity Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Canberra, May. p. 94 
 
 
PTAs can have an alternating impact on countries in the region especially when the regions are highly 
heterogeneous and include both developing and developed countries (UNCTAD 2009; Chen 2009). 
When transportation costs decrease as a result of integration, companies have more variety to choose 
where it places the production. If multinational companies transfer production into a more attractive 
location, for example due to lower production costs, the less attractive country may face declining 
FDI inflow (Chen, 2009). Although, UNCTAD (2009) states that the net effect of such reorganization 
on FDI is difficult to predict.  
 
These findings indicate that we cannot assume a causal relationship between PTA and FDI. The 
evidence from the studies on this subject suggest a positive relationship, however, isolating the impact 
of PTA on FDI, and the FDI growth due to wide-ranging economic and technological forces is 
difficult and might cause varying results. Therefore, the next chapter reviews impact of previous 
similar agreements referable to CETA.  
 
 
3.2. Review of previous similar agreements 
 
This chapter will present the FDI trends resulting from similar free trade agreements as CETA, and 
analyze their comparability to CETA. The comparability depends on multiple factors, such as 
similarities and differences in country factors, previous FDI integration between the counterparts, and 
similarities in the FDI restrictions. Useful agreements should contain similar provisions as CETA and 
the participating countries should be at least somehow comparable with the EU and Canada. North 
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America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Australia 
(AUSFTA) were chosen as useful indicators to assess CETA’s impact on FDI.  
 
 
3.2.1. North America Free Trade Agreement  
 
The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a trade agreement between the United States, 
Canada and Mexico taken into force in 1994. In addition to similar economic and social goals with 
CETA, NAFTA as well deleted 99% of the tariffs on traded goods, lowered barriers on FDI, and 
increased investor protection (Feils & Rahman, 2008). In addition, NAFTA includes a dispute 
settlement mechanism and similar intellectual property provisions. Free trade agreement between the 
counterparts was a natural follow up for their former integration and intimate location.  
 
While the economic scope of NAFTA and CETA is somewhat different, NAFTA is still useful 
illustration of the reinforcement of such commercial relations. In the Kirkpatrick, et al. Sustainability 
Impact Assessment (2011) NAFTA is noted as an especially useful indicator if the FDI relationship 
between Canada and the U.S. is considered. Although, the relationship between Canada and the U.S. 
was already matured and integrated before NAFTA. The EU is not as integrated with Canada as 
Canada was with the U.S. before the agreement.  
 
The FDI impacts between the U.S. and Canada was chosen to be addressed. Mexico’s relevance in 
this analysis is questionable due to its developing nature. The comparability to neither Canada nor 
the EU is relevant. According to number of studies the FDI impact between the U.S. and Canada was 
positive (e.g. Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Buckley et al., 2000; Kirkpatrick et al. 2011). Feils & 
Rahman (2008) and Waldkirch & Tekin-Koru (2010) found that the impact on FDI was positive, but 
ambiguous for individual member countries. According to Kirkpatrick et al. (2011) the overall impact 
of NAFTA was positive, but it is unclear how much resulted from the investment chapter.  
 
 
3.2.2. Australia and the United States Free Trade Agreement  
 
The best estimate for the impact of CETA is likely to be the results of the Free Trade Agreement 
between the U.S. and Australia (AUSFTA) signed in 2004. Similarly, as CETA AUSFTA raised the 
review threshold for investments from the U.S., improved intellectual property protection, and 
liberalized FDI restrictions, especially screening (Armstrong, 2015). Australia has negotiated several 
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FTAs but AUSFTA is the only which has significantly lowered barriers on foreign investments 
(Kirchner, 2012).   
  
Similarities in restrictiveness can be found in the U.S. and the EU economies as well as in Australia’s 
and Canada’s economies, which makes AUSFTA a better baseline for analyzing CETA (Kirkpatrick 
et al., 2011). Australia is relatively high restricted as well as Canada, whereas EU and the U.S. have 
lower restrictions. While Australia is generally more restricted than most countries, it’s however 
significantly less restricted than Canada. The previous integration can be seen similar as well if 
distance is considered. While the U.S. and Canada have a relatively mature relationship, neither of 
them has as far developed relationship with neither the EU nor Australia.  
 
Relatively few analyses of the FDI impact of AUSFTA was found. According to Armstrong (2015) 
FDI flow from the U.S. to Australia has been rising from 2005 to 2012 but the share of total FDI has 
remained fairly steady during the time period. According to Kirchner (2012) liberalizing screening 
increased inward FDI to Australia, although Armstrong et al. (2015) claim that the effect of the 
preferential liberalization of investment screening on investment flows is hard to isolate. Armstrong 
et al. (2015) also criticizes Kirchner’s analysis for the reason it couldn’t provide an explanation why 
liberalization in screening increased FDI inflows.  
 
4. EU and Canada Integration and Investment Environments 
 
Bilateral relations between the European Union and Canada started in 1950s, both economic and 
political relationship have always been stable. In 1976 EU and Canada signed the Framework 
Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation which was followed by the Declaration on 
Transatlantic Relations in 1990. Since 1976 Canada and EU have concluded multiple sectoral 
agreements and EU member states have bilateral agreements with Canada. Now the cooperation will 
deepen in economic and trade matters, but also in political and social actions. In addition to CETA, 
EU and Canada will be signing Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) which will enhance co-
operation in such issues as international peace and security, counter-terrorism, human rights and 
nuclear non-proliferation, climate change, sustainable development, and innovation. (European 
Commission and Government of Canada, 2008) 
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4.1 Current integration 
 
For long Canada and the EU have both been important trading partners to each other. Currently EU 
is the second important trading partner for Canada and for EU Canada is the 10th most important. 
Exports from Canada to EU in 2016 were €32,223 million and imports to EU were €29,075 (European 
Commission, 2017c). Both exports and imports have been generally steady for the last five years and 
imports have been slightly increasing. Tariffs between the EU and Canada for most goods are low, 
excluding tariffs for processed food which are set generally high (European Commission and 
Government of Canada, 2008). Services are a significant part of the trade in such areas as transport 
and travel services, and insurance and finance services. (European Commission, 2017a) 
  
EU is Canada's second largest FDI provider with €248.8 billion stock value in 2015. The most 
important investment sector is affiliate sales which stands for selling the goods in a foreign country 
through the established production in the country. FDI towards EU in 2016 totaled €219.2 billion 
which was roughly 1/5 of Canadian direct investment abroad. FDI flow has been steadily increasing 
from 2007 until 2015 when Canadian FDI in Europe faced a decline.  
 
Labor mobility between the EU and Canada is relatively efficient in both regions, but more restricted 
in Canada. As most countries Canada has limited labor mobility to temporary visits. Foreigners 
wanting to work in Canada can be accepted under Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) 
(Kirkpatrick, et al., 2011). Canadians have a relatively easy access to countries in the EU. Most of 
the countries welcome Canadian business people under Schengen acquis and some countries, such as 
UK and Ireland, decide arrival approval case by case basis (Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). 
 
 
4.2. FDI restriction types in EU and Canada 
 
Limiting foreign ownership particularly in key sectors, screening and approval procedures, 
constraints on foreign personnel and operational freedom, and other restrictions such as informal 
barriers, are formal ways to restrict foreign investments (Golub, 2003). This chapter reviews each of 
these briefly before comparing restrictions in the EU and Canada.  
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Equity restrictions 
The most common way to restrict foreign investments is limiting foreign ownership. Foreign 
ownership can, for example, be limited up to 50% for non-residents, or even completely prohibited 
in certain sectors (OECD, 2008). Generally high limitations in foreign ownership are used in service 
sector, including telecommunications, air and maritime transport, and finance (UNCTAD, 2009). 
These sectors are mostly protected due to national security and national sovereignty considerations. 
In comparison, manufacturing is the least restricted and often encouraged in multiple countries 
(Golub, 2003).  
 
Screening 
Obligatory screening and approval procedures can include stipulations for foreign investments 
economic benefits for the host country, national interest tests, or pre-notification requirement for 
investors (Kalinova, 2010; Golub, 2003). The strictest requirements require investors to present 
evidence for providing net benefit for the host country, and lowest require a notification of a new 
investment.  
 
Constraints on foreign personnel and operational freedom 
Constraints on foreign personnel and operational freedom often include stipulations for the amount 
of non-resident in the board of directors, the ability to either manage or to work in affiliates. 
Restraining can discourage foreign investments as it restricts company’s freedom over their foreign 
agencies. The time foreign personnel can spend in the country might be restricted or even denied with 
duration of permissible work permits for expatriate executives. (Golub, 2003) 
 
Other restrictions 
Other restrictions target operations of foreign investors. This category is considered the least 
important of the restriction types. Restrictions include establishment of branches, acquisition of land 
for business purposes, reciprocity clauses in particular sectors, and restrictions on profit or capital 
repatriation (Kalinova, 2010). 
 
 
4.3. Comparison of the investment environments in the EU and Canada 
 
The investment environment in both Canada and the EU is governed the domestic and international 
rules to protect and decrease concerns of losing national sovereignty. The investment environment 
can be assessed with OECD's FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (FDI Index) which uses four 
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categories to analyze the investment environment; foreign equity limits, screening and prior approval, 
restrictions on key foreign personnel/directors, and other restrictions (Kalinova, 2010). Categories 
are weighted by their significance, for example foreign equity limitation is more important than 
screening (Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). The FDI Index is not a perfect measure of investment 
environment however, it gives an overview of the attractiveness of country's investment climate 
considering barriers rising from rules set by the government. 
 
The current FDI Index for Canada is 0.166 and for EU the average is 0.048 (0 = most open, 1 = most 
closed), which indicates that Canada's investment environment is more restricted than the EU's 
(OECD, 2017). Canada has significantly improved its investment climate from 2006 when FDI Index 
was 0.359, but has still notably high restrictions compared to the EU (Kirkpatrick et al., 2011).  
 
From Chart 1 we can see that the most common restriction type for both EU and Canada is equity 
restrictions. The commonness is generally explained by national security concerns and protecting 
domestic industries from foreign competition.  
 
Chart 1. FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index in EU Countries and Canada, 2016, 
breakdown by type of restriction 
 
Source: Data from OECD, 2017 
Note: Missing data from Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Malta 
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Restrictions in the European Union are generally low however include some exceptions, e.g. Austria 
(see Chart 1). Austria is the highest restricted EU country and the equity restrictions are slightly 
higher than in Canada. EU countries do have common statutes but exceptions rise from the non-
harmonized nature of EU’s investment environment.  
 
Canada is one of the highest restricted OECD country in terms of FDI and the investment environment 
is protected by multiple acts defining the sectoral limitations. The challenging investment targets for 
foreign investors are telecommunication, media, transport, air, and fisheries (see Table 2). 
Restrictions in telecommunication and media are common and can be understood by the desire to 
protect sovereignty. Most of the restrictions in telecoms, media and air limit the non-Canadian 
ownership of voting shares to a certain threshold (Riley, 2001).  
 
Table 2 lists Regulatory Restrictiveness Indexes by sector and industry in the EU and Canada. Apart 
from maritime, and agriculture and forestry, all other sectors are more or less restricted in Canada 
than in the EU.   
 
Table 2. FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index by sector/industry, 
EU average & Canada, 2016  
 
(0 = most open, 1 = most closed) 
 
Sector/Industry 
EU 
average Canada 
Media 0,064 0,710 
Telecoms 0,013  0,565  
Financial Services 0,009  0,073  
Business Services 0,051  0,100  
Transport 0,135  0,267  
Maritime 0,120  0,100  
Air 0,272  0,600  
Agriculture & Forestry 0,024  0,010  
Fisheries 0,168  0,600  
Manufacturing 0,002  0,100  
 
Source: Data from OECD, 2017 
Note: Missing data from Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Malta 
 
Financial service sectors play an important role in bilateral investment for both EU and Canada. 
Establishing is limited, but this concerns both domestic and foreign investors. In addition, Canada 
exercises an additional screening process for investments over $1 billion CAD for WTO members 
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(Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). Investments crossing this threshold must present evidence that their 
investment will provide net benefit for Canada. 
 
Business sector includes legal, accounting, tax. prep and bookkeeping, architectural, engineering, 
advertising, computer system design and other business services. The sector is already facing 
relatively low restrictions in both regions and doesn’t leave much room for liberalization. Although, 
some sectors face stricter restrictions which gives more potential to CETA.  
 
 
5. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement  
 
 
CETA is a comprehensive agreement between European Union and Canada concerning trade and 
investments. CETA was originally introduced in 2009, accepted in 2014 and is yet to be entirely 
ratified and taken into practice. The provisional application of the agreement will start in September 
2017, and the full ratification will be ready when all parliaments in member states have approved the 
agreement (European Commission, 2017a). The provisional application excludes specific concerns, 
such as investment protection, Investment Court System, and investment market access with regards 
to portfolio investment (European Commission, 2017a). These in their final form might be different. 
 
CETA is the most ambitious agreement yet made and is in many means significant agreement for 
both the EU and Canada. CETA is EU's first comprehensive agreement made with a highly 
industrialized country and the first bilateral economic agreement to include Investment Court System 
(European Commission and Government of Canada, 2008). For Canada CETA is the most ambitious 
agreement but not the first of a kind, as Canada is a member of NAFTA.  
 
CETA aims to increase growth, and job and business opportunities decreasing barriers in co-
operation. The agreement will eliminate nearly all customs duties to zero by the end of the 
commissioning period, end limitations in access to public contracts, open-up services' market, provide 
unsurprising environment for investors, and help avoid illegal copying in EU innovations and 
traditional products (Cantemir, 2015). In addition, CETA is anticipated to create jobs, liberalize job 
movement, create new opportunities on both markets especially for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME), lower prices and offer greater variety of choices for customers (European 
Commission, 2016a).  
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According to Kirkpatrick et al. (2011) and European Commission (2017b) positive impact from 
CETA as a whole on foreign investments is expected, and it could be ‘notable’ but it is not likely to 
be significant. It is expected that the positive impact will be directed to specific sectors.  
 
 
5.1. CETA’s impacts in a broad perspective 
 
Resulting from the lack of empirical information, analysis of CETA’s potential impacts on FDI will 
be performed on grounds of the available information about CETA, links between previous PTAs 
and FDI, and theoretical framework. Consequences are difficult to predict since CETA together with 
the investment provisions and other commitments can have repealing impacts and no clear causal 
relationship can be assumed. Although, the provisional application excludes provisions on investment 
protection and dispute settlement system, these will be analyzed in this thesis in their current form, 
regardless of the exclusion from the provisional application.  
 
Apart from the investment chapter CETA as a whole includes multiple commitments important for 
illustrating the impact on foreign investment flows. This chapter will introduce investment provisions 
and other potentially important commitments for FDI included in CETA such as trade, intellectual 
property rights, labor mobility, and investor protection, and analyze the potential impact on FDI. The 
impacts of the commitments are sometimes difficult to predict with unambiguous certainty.  
 
Changes in the internal FDI distribution can be expected, especially in the EU. As discussed earlier, 
reducing FDI barriers in heterogeneous and integrated areas may have an asymmetric impact on the 
integrated bloc. EU is a relatively heterogeneous region as most of the countries are developed but 
some are still developing. Cultures, interests, and policies vary greatly as well. Multinational 
corporations can replace production from countries with high production costs to a more favorable 
country if it comes less costly to export within the integrated bloc. 
 
 
5.1.1. Services and investment 
 
The measures defined in the investment chapter are set to expand market access between the parties, 
protect investors, and ensure non-discriminatory treatment, known also as national treatment 
(European Commission, 2016a). Non-discriminatory treatment grants equal treatment for both 
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domestic and foreign investors. Investment chapter promises to decrease barriers on FDI, such as 
foreign equity caps, screening, and performance requirements, allowing investors to transfer capital 
between the counterparts freely. Investment Court System (ICS), a new mechanism, is proposed to 
be set to alleviate the fair and quick processing of disputes between the state and foreign investors. 
 
Instead of defining which sectors are liberalized, CETA includes a ‘negative list’, which lists 
reservations for measures to be excluded from the sectoral liberalization and no other restrictions will 
apply. According to European Commission (2016a) the content of these reservations relates to 
obligations on national treatment, Most-Favored-Nation treatment, market access, and performance 
requirements especially in the area of services and investments. These measures are listed in two 
annexes depending whether the Parties want to remain their right to change the restrictions.  
The first, ‘Annex I’, includes existing measures and restrictions which the parties want to maintain 
concerning service providers and investors of the other side. Furthermore, European Commission 
(2016a) states that investors will benefit also of any future liberalization. While the measures in 
Annex I cannot be changed, ‘Annex II’ lists measures and restrictions which the parties want to 
maintain but as well reserves the right to adopt new more restrictive measures. (European 
Commission, 2016a) 
Additional liberalization may be applied and especially Canada has agreed to a new liberalization in 
certain sectors, such as postal services, telecoms and maritime transport (European Commission, 
2016a). Canada promised to maintain the current level of restrictions in certain financial services and 
not to make them more restrictive.  
 
Screening restrictions will be reduced in Canada, facilitating foreign investments. The net benefit 
review threshold for the EU FDI in Canada will be raised from the current $354 million CAD to $1.5 
billion CAD. Meaning that non-sensitive investments under $1.5 billion will not be required to notify 
the Canadian Government and won’t be objected.  
 
EU wanted to maintain flexibility in public services and included reservations concerning education, 
health, social services, public transport, and water supply in Annex II. Whereas, the level of 
liberalization in mining, energy, and environmental services, is now binding through Annex I.  
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Potential impact of liberalization 
Liberalization means decreasing or abolishing restrictions in entry and establishment, ownership and 
control, operational restrictions, and authorizing and reporting, but also building standards of 
treatment (see Figure 1) (UNCTAD, 1998). Liberalization can be seen as a FDI determinant since 
FDI cannot enter into a country without allowance. According to UNCTAD (1998) liberalization is 
needed and may encourage foreign investment however, it does not guarantee that FDI will occur. 
Kirkpatrick et al. (2011) agree that investment liberalization is a generally recognized attractor of 
investment and growth when combined with certain other policies e.g. investor protection, fair and 
equitable treatment, transparency, and a comprehensive legal framework.  
 
Figure 1. The liberalization of FDI policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Kirkpatrick et al. (2011) the first important step for FDI would be taken through 
liberalizing certain sectors. Liberalizing the sectoral FDI restrictions might have different magnitude 
to EU and Canada. Considering how low the current restrictions for foreign investments in the EU 
are, CETA may not reduce the level in any significant degree. Whereas, Canada is one of the highest 
restricted countries which indicates that CETA could offer possibilities in highly restricted sectors 
for foreign investors. This could be interpreted that CETA's effect on FDI flows will be more 
significant towards Canada than the EU. 
 
Certain service sectors have a great potential to attract FDI flow under CETA, such as postal and 
telecom services. Kirkpatrick et al. (2011) states that the Canadian telecom sector has a large potential 
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cultural objectives are disturbing the liberalization. However, the European Commission (2017b) 
services respond to Kirkpatrick et al. analysis and criticize the statement of compromising the cultural 
objectives and point out that the EU has fully legalized telecoms without any problems. Which leads 
one to ask why wouldn’t Canada be able to do the same.  Depending on the final level of liberalization 
in the telecom sector, the sector could have a lot of potential for further growth. As when compared 
to the other OECD countries, the Canadian telecom sector is currently less competitive, mainly due 
to high restrictions. Competition would widen the choice for customers and lower the overall costs. 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 2011) 
 
Whereas, low restrictions in manufacturing and business sector will not leave much room for CETA 
to improve the FDI environment. Foreign investment in these sectors is not expected to increase 
considerably. Manufacturing is generally the largest target for foreign investments, which can be 
partly explained by significantly low restrictions in most of the countries. Low restrictions indicate 
that it's harder to attract more FDI to manufacturing.  
 
 
5.1.2. Trade 
 
Tariffs for European and Canadian products will be cut by €400 million a year starting on the 
implementation day and the amount will be raised to €500 million a year until the end of the 
transitional period (European Commission, 2017a). ‘Rule of origin’ will define what products are 
qualified as ‘European’ and ‘Canadian’ to prevent third parties indirectly abusing the agreement. 
According to a prospective analysis conducted by the Canadian Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) 
(2016) the total GDP increase in Canada is estimated to be 0.16% and in EU 0.02% resulting from 
the price effects of the tariff reductions cascade through the economy via income and substitution 
effects.  
 
Potential impact of trade commitments on FDI 
The effect of trade on FDI flows is ambiguous. Theoretically trade openness can have two-way 
influences on FDI and trade can act as a complement or substitute for FDI. On the one hand, open 
cross-border trade is found to be positively related to investments (Kirchner, 2012; Adams et al., 
2003). Decreasing barriers on goods will lower trade costs leading to changes in expenditures 
(Anderson et al., 2016). Eventually market size grows – a key determinant of FDI – and creates more 
incentives (Medvedev, 2011). In a foreign country companies can serve consumers straight, rather 
than through exporting. For companies, it might be better to invest in countries with similar factor 
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endowments if the benefit of proximity to consumers is larger than benefit of scale economy (Chen, 
2009).  
 
On the other hand, trade can become a more attractive choice than FDI, resulting in a decrease in FDI 
flows. Regarding to market-seeking or “tariff-jumping” motivated companies, primarily FDI would 
be expected to decrease because trade liberalization makes exporting from the home country more 
attractive option than foreign investment in order to serve the regional market (Adams et al., 2003).  
 
However, the impact of trade openness is not as straightforward if companies have an efficiency-
seeking approach and investment was originally undertaken to exploit assets. If target country’s 
comparative advantages create more benefit for multinational companies locating in a foreign country 
becomes more attractive. Company’s production process components require different intensities and 
companies often fragment the production process internationally to countries where the factor used 
in the value chain is abundant (Chen, 2009; Blomström & Kokko, 1997; Vetter, 2014). High labor 
endowment is a particular attractor of FDI especially in the case of labor sensitive industries (Chen, 
2009).  
 
 
5.1.3. Intellectual Property Rights 
 
CETA will make intellectual property rights more consistent between the parties which will create 
more level playing field for companies in EU and Canada. Primarily the changes will be in Canadian 
IPR laws. Changes will consider copyrights, patents, protection of technological measures, and digital 
rights management (European Commission, 2016a). Canada has also promised to fight against the 
counterfeit trademark goods, pirated copyright goods, and counterfeit geographical indication goods 
(European Commission, 2016a).  
 
Potential impact of IPR commitments 
Many EU and Canadian products rely on innovation and creativity, and consequently intellectual 
property rights (IPR) play an important role in attracting FDI as poor IPR increases the chance of 
imitation and consequence in losses for investors. Intellectual property might be the key competitive 
advantage for companies and in the environment of poor IPR, theft can take away the advantage 
which was exclusively theirs (Haley, 2000). The importance of IPR varies across sectors and 
investment projects, for example R&D sector tends to prefer strong IPR (Javorcik, 2002). 
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More benefits have occurred in countries which have had weak property rights which a commissioned 
trade agreement has improved (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003). Hallward-Driemeier (2003) presents a 
common hypothesis that countries with weak property rights are more likely to appear as potential 
hosts for FDI if they improve their property rights and ensure the investors of stable environment. 
Countries must also assure their commitment to honoring these property rights to foreign investors 
as in some cases good property rights have been used only as a way to attract FDI and have then been 
neglected.  
  
Kirkpatrick, et al. (2011) assume that IPR related decisions will benefit specific sectors and through 
that possibly increase FDI flows. Although Kirkpatrick, et al. (2011) didn’t address the fact that 
Canada has autonomously improved the relevant IPR legislation and only minor part of changes will 
follow from CETA. The effect of IPR related commitments is not expected to be significant, since 
neither of the parties made any major changes in their legislation.  
 
 
5.1.4. Labor mobility 
 
CETA has a temporary entry provision which will lower restrictions on labor mobility and enhance 
movement between the counterparts (European Commission, 2016a). Certain professionals and 
businesspeople, such as investors, intra-company transferees, technologists, and short-term business 
visitors have an easier access to temporary travel or relocate. Through temporary entry provision 
investors will have a greater certainty over their investments in EU and Canada. Intra-corporate 
transferees with their spouses and families are allowed to visit up to three years regardless of their 
sector of activity. Access of ‘Contractual service suppliers’ or ‘independent professionals’ will be 
increased to 12 months instead of the earlier 6 months. (European Commission, 2016a) 
 
Potential impact of labor mobility commitments 
Improving the labor mobility will most likely have a positive effect on FDI, nevertheless the impact 
will not be negative. A study made by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005 found that 10% 
increase in temporary movement correlated to an 8% increase of FDI inflows and 7.1% of FDI 
outflows (as cited in Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). According to researches the impact will be clearer in 
non-service sectors than service sectors (Kirkpatrick, et al., 2011).  
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5.1.5 Investor protection 
 
To ensure a functional foreign investment environment a dispute settlement mechanism is needed to 
protect investors, ensure a non-discriminatory treatment, and to avoid state-to-state conflicts. Non-
discrimination stands for equal treatment of foreign investors and domestic investors. Even though it 
might seem self-evident that non-discrimination should be an essential part of investment policy the 
definition itself is sometimes problematic and ambiguous.  
 
Canada is the most sued developed country in the world (Barlow, 2016). According to Barlow (2016) 
Canada has spent over €45 million defending itself in disputes occurred under NAFTA. A strong 
emphasis has been put on the dispute settlement claim by many authors and it’s considered as a key 
objective in attracting the FDI inflow (e.g. Cingotti et al., 2016; Hallward-Driemeier, 2003; Barlow, 
2016). The failure of investor protection systems inevitably leads to taxpayer’s losses for legitimate 
public policy measures (Cingotti et al., 2016). The dispute settlement is yet under discussion and the 
public is currently strongly opposing the inclusion of the entire investor protection system in CETA 
as it in its current form fails to grant security for the state and its citizens. 
 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) has been the common mechanism in the past negotiated 
agreements to solve disputes between governments and investors. ISDS defines on what terms foreign 
investors are allowed to bypass domestic courts to directly challenge government for measures that 
may negatively impact their investments. ISDS often brings corporations equal to governments in 
negotiations and leaves states and their populations without protection (Barlow, 2016). Corporations 
are able to sue governments directly without first pursuing action through country's legal system 
whenever new legislation negatively affects their profits. According to Barlow (2016) corporations 
are generally favored in these disputes and governments lose millions. ISDS has led to corporations 
abusing the system and taking actions against government measures whenever new law or practice 
affects their bottom line (Barlow, 2016). Hallward-Driemeier (2003) suggests that some investors 
might favor the legal systems favorability over economic reasons if there is a chance for successful 
litigation against the host government and where the investor protection mechanism is functioning.  
 
ISDS has gained major public opposition which has followed up to replacing ISDS with Investment 
Court System (ICS) in CETA. Investment Court System is a proposal of a new independent 
mechanism which consists of permanent tribunal and an appeal tribunal (European Commission, 
2016b). According to the European Commission (2016b) the standard treatment of investors and 
 
 
 24 
investments is precisely introduced and doesn't leave discretion to the members of the tribunal. ICS 
will be a transparent and fair dispute settlement mechanism without ambiguities. The system is 
supposed to prevent egregious attacks made by investors towards government, which have occurred 
under ISDS, and reassure the public that public policy making wouldn't be affected negatively. 
European Commission (2016b) states that ICS will remove the flaws which made the previous dispute 
settlement system open to abuses. 
 
CETA promises to fully preserve EU's and Canada’s ability to right to regulate however, stakeholders 
accuse its poorly definition and possible openness for interpretation. ‘Right to regulate’ is defined as 
country's ability to adopt and apply their own laws and regulations. Countries must have right to 
regulate its laws and regulations without the fear of getting sued by investors who accuse a new law 
negatively impacting their investment. Right to regulate has to be well defined for the sake of both 
parties, as investors must also be aware of their rights concerning government’s right to regulate. 
 
Indeed, ICS seems to have improved the investor protection and clarified the terms but yet fails to 
create a functioning system. It grants rights to investors but fails to protect the government and public 
policy making from exploitation. Terms, such as government's “right to regulate”, are claimed to be 
poorly defined and are open to interpretation leading to possible abuse (Cingotti et al., 2016). The 
proposal of the dispute settlement system has been criticized and seems falls short on addressing core 
concerns. ICS is claimed to be ISDS under another name (Cingotti et al., 2016). 
 
A research made by Cingotti et al. (2016) test whether cases failed under ISDS would pass under the 
anticipated ICS and whether ICS would represent a remarkable change from the current iniquities of 
ISDS arbitration. The results were disappointing as the analysis shows that all the tested cases could 
still be launched allowing companies to challenge the government. Which supports the claim of ICS 
being the same kind of failure as ISDS. 
 
 
Potential impact of Investment Court System on FDI 
The court systems in Canada and the EU already include high protection for both domestic and 
foreign investors. However, EU has never committed in any dispute settlement mechanism and the 
proposed ICS system could open possibilities for the EU investors to sue Canada, but also might 
expose EU for abuse as well (Kirkpatrick et al., 2011).  
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Kirkpatrick et al (2011) doubts that the mechanism wouldn’t create a net sustainability benefit due to 
the conflicting costs and benefits, but also states that without enforcement of such mechanism there 
is no reason to believe that the Investment chapter would create the same positive economic impacts 
as expected. The current ICS proposal does not maximize sustainable economic benefits, however if 
EU and Canada manage to improve ICS in significant matter and make the legal investment 
environment favorable it might support the other provisions to attract investors. 
 
 
5.2. Potential positive effects of CETA based on the analysis of NAFTA and AUSFTA  
 
Most of the previous literature adduced positive FDI impact from both NAFTA and AUSFTA. This 
chapter briefly explains why CETA could have a positive impact on the FDI flows if the consequences 
are similar as NAFTA and AUSFTA had. 
 
NAFTA had a positive impact on the FDI flows between the U.S. and Canada. Since the relationship 
between the EU and Canada is not as integrated as Canada’s relationship was with the U.S. before 
commissioning of NAFTA, CETA could have potential to attract more FDI. According to Kirkpatrick 
et al. (2011) the effect between Canada and the EU might have a larger scale due to the lower level 
of integration. The explanation for this potential impact is that before NAFTA, the U.S. and Canada 
had executed FDI actions on a larger scale and didn’t leave as much room for FDI actions as a less 
mature relationship would have. Canada and the EU have an advanced FDI relationship, but the 
number of new opportunities is larger.  
 
Analysis of AUSFTA adduced two potential reasons why FDI flows could increase. Both are based 
on Canada’s strict FDI environment and the large scale of opportunities, which CETA could offer by 
the FDI liberalization. Both Canada and Australia are highly restricted in the FDI area, however 
Australia is significantly less restricted than Canada. Firstly, if the impact of CETA is estimated based 
on the comparison of the restriction environments in Australia and Canada, CETA has more potential 
to encourage more FDI in Canada than AUSFTA did in Australia. Secondly, if liberalizing screening 
was one of the reasons why inward FDI flow towards Australia increased, it could indicate that 
Canada would receive FDI inflow for the same reason.  
 
The analysis based on NAFTA and AUSFTA implicates at least two reasons why FDI flows could 
increase in the case of Canada and the EU; lower level of integration between Canada and the EU, 
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and strict FDI environment in Canada and Australia. The analysis suggests that, presumably CETA 
could increase FDI between the counterparts on a larger scale than AUSFTA, and the same amount 
or more as NAFTA.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to estimate the potential impacts on Foreign Direct Investment flows rising 
from the commitments made in the EU – Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. 
Kirkpatrick et al. (2011) and European Commission (2017b) estimated that a positive impact from 
CETA as a whole on FDI flows is expected, and it could be ‘notable’ but it is not likely to be 
significant. This estimation is aligned with the analysis of this thesis. As we are talking about two 
relatively developed countries it is logic that these countries attract significantly new FDI as much as 
a distinctly developing country would. 
 
The impact was approached by analyzing the link between FDI and PTA, analyzing NAFTA and 
AUSFTA, and the current states of EU and Canada's investment climates and the potential for those 
to be improved under CETA. The FDI impact is difficult to isolate from growth resulting from other 
sources which makes the link between FDI and PTA ambiguous. Although, several authors noted a 
positive relationship between FDI and PTA (e.g. Medvedev, 2011; Büthe & Milner, 2008; Lederman 
et al, 2005). NAFTA and AUSFTA based analysis supported some positive consequences of CETA 
in FDI flows, and the analysis of the investment climates offered several reasons to believe CETA 
has a potential to increase the FDI flows.  
 
Non-trade provisions, such as FDI liberalization, were found to be the most important driver of FDI 
flows and it could be expected to be an important determinant in CETA. By reducing market 
distortions and building standards of treatment CETA has potential to increase FDI flows. High 
restrictions could indicate that CETA might have high potential to enhance the openness of 
investment environment. Whereas the EU doesn’t have as much possibilities to attract FDI by 
liberalizing restrictions. The impact will most likely not be significant in the EU, considering its 
current relatively attractive investment environment and already low restrictions. 
 
The analysis brought up a few reasons which could slow down the potential FDI growth or even cause 
a decrease in foreign investment flows. It cannot be assumed that liberalizing FDI restrictions will 
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inevitably increase investments. Firstly, when both FDI restrictions, and tariff and non-tariff barriers 
for goods decrease multinational corporations have more freedom to choose whether to export or 
invest (Motta and Norman, 1993). If the reduction of trade barriers has a larger impact on exporting 
making it more productive than investing then exporting might become more profitable for 
companies. Consequently, FDI flows might decrease.  
 
Secondly, for the same reason, a heterogeneous and integrated bloc can face an internal distribution 
in FDI flows after commissioning a PTA. Lower transaction costs offer wider choice of countries for 
investors to place their investment. Consequently, certain countries may face a decrease in FDI flows. 
This might be the case especially for the EU where countries are relatively heterogeneous.  
 
Thirdly, the ongoing debate concerning the dispute settlement might decelerate the increase in foreign 
investment flows. Currently the Investment Court System proposal is left outside of the provisional 
application and will be under further consideration. If ICS is improved, the dispute system can offer 
more incentives for investors to enter into FDI.  
 
Despite these obstacles, this thesis introduced several reasons to believe that CETA has a high 
potential to increase FDI flows between these low risk countries in certain sectors. Currently CETA 
is being ratified by the governments of Canada and the EU and its member states. The commissioning 
will start by provisional application and whether the FDI flows eventually increase on a ‘notable’ 
scale remains to be seen. 
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